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Blackburn Ruling Ethics

This is the fourth and last entry on Simon Blackburn's "Ruling Passions".  The first is Simon Blackburn: Ruling Passions, the second Expressivist Meta-Ethics, the third Expressivist Normative Ethics.

- As we have seen in the previous two entries, Blackburn effectively defends Humean ethics.  He shows it as the only method that truly appreciates the subjective nature of experiences and the complexity with which we find ourselves in the world.  Now we will see specifically how he addresses other theories and tears them down, showing one true victor, the Humean attitude. 

Open Question:

- This concept was famously thought of by G.E. Moore.  He was trying to find the basis for value in actions.  By starting with ideas like "things that bring you pleasure are good" he found that these statements are always contingent on other prevailing circumstances, basically that this statement could never be purported to be true, thus that the question of its validity was always "open" for disagreement.

Smile
-For instance, the blowjob that this guy is receiving below the picture may seem good (and pleasurable), but there are a million determining factors that could prove it not to be.  Consider that, by the smile on his face, it isn't his wife doing the deed, now we have pretty serious doubt as to its goodness. 

-This is a big blow to both the Kantians and Consequentialists.  For they both demand Reason-based accounts of what is right.  But, as Blackburn states, these determinations of rightness are completely vulnerable to the "open question". 

"The reason expressivism in ethics has to be correct is that if we suppose that belief, denial, and so on were simply discussions of a way the world is, we would still face the open question." To suppose that objective Reason can determine rightness is falling into a trap of continuous open statements.  Thus the way to beat this trend is through expressivism, "We must synthesize it, rather than discover it by analysis."

"Expressivism claims that the ethical proposition is something that we synthesize for a purpose.  Its role is to act as a focus for practical thought."  Thus, because Expressivism takes into account the situational variances and does not attempt to be wholly analytic or a priori, it evades having to answer for broad statements of the "good", which the "open question" demolish.

Smile_1By taking into account the situation of this picture, we can more rightly determine its ethical value.  This man might be experiencing pleasure, but not of the ethical sort. 

Kantians

- Blackburn spends the most time addressing Kant and his later followers, mostly because they have had such a profound impact on ethical thought.  The Kantian is not to be taken lightly, theyre heavy dudes and chicks, believe me.

- The most obvious attack that Blackburn throws at the Kantian is that it is just not realistic in any way.  Kant totally disregards the role of desires in decision making, instead reverting to the big R Reason for determining what is right. 

"Neither our motivations nor our actions have a rigid, one-word, essence.  When the mad axeman asks where my children are so that he may slaughter them, and I misdirect him, I need not be acting on the maxim that lying is always permissible, or permissible when I feel like it."

AxemanThere are great reasons to lie to the axeman.  But the Kantian is a "slave to his duties".  They are bound by the Categorical Imperitive, and with each decision they can't bring in the context of the situation, like "should I lie to the guy with the hatchet who will cut my family to pieces?"  Instead they have to worry about the act of lying in itself and follow the imperitive rule that to lie is wrong.  It doesn't follow Reason to allow the axeman to destroy your family. 

- The "open question" demolishes the rightness of the maxim "It is never good to lie".  There are simply too many circumstances in life to allow Reason to analytically determine action.

-Furthermore, the Kantian is inherantly a selfish person.  The Cat. Imp. seems like a world wide good, but in essence, it makes each person terrified to deny their own maxims.  They act for their own moral well-being, not for the well-being of anyone else. 

"You don't kill, even to save life...This way of thinking is intrinsically concerned with one's own agency: the descriptions one could give of one's own actions.  It is as if our overwhelming concern is with the history of our own doings, told in a few rather simple terms. " 
StudentIts like this kid, who just told the teacher that a group of badasses were kissing girls behing the bleachers.  He simply had to tell the teacher, because of the maxim determined by Reason that it was the right thing to do, boys shouldn't be kissing girls.  The glaring problem is that this kid sucks.  He's a selfish little bugger who the Kantian would say just wanted to do what's right, but everyone else in the class knows he did it to suck up to the teacher.  Hopefully, he gets his ass whooped after school.  Alas, that might be the fate of all Kantians. 

Consequentialists

-Boy does the "open question" kill these guys.  Imagine the conversation of these two about the basic premise of consequentialism, (address whichever voice you want to whomever)

Conversation
"It is good to do what is good for the greatest number"
"Why?"
"Because when the greatest number are served people will have more peace"
"Why is peace good?"
"Peace is good because then people can live in harmony with each other"
"Why is harmony good?
"Harmony is good because then happiness will pervade the world instead of anger"
"Why is happiness good"

-You get the idea.   There is always another question and the "good" to come out of it is never reasonably correct. 

-Another attack on consequentialism is that it ignores the present for the sake of the future. 

"consequentialist reasoning is...essentially forward-looking.  It looks to what action will bring about.  Once that is done different features of consequences might matter.  We shall find that the past and the present matter as well, and independently of their role as a signpost for the future." 

- A major problem with always acting for future considerations is that you don't know what future end your decision will make.  You may hope and act for future considerations, like "greatest good for all" but there is no way to know that your decision will bring this about.  You may be acting for the best, but inherently your actions are rather meaningless.

Relativism

- The problem with talking ethically about relativism is that, at its essence, it is anti-ethical (not that this makes it wrong).  You have to attack it in defense of the project of ethics. 

- Now Rorty wants ethics to boil down into a power struggle between people trying to push their new language on others.  In this there is no real ethical proposition.  The easiest trump card to play here can be wholly described in one picture:

Hitler_3   Have fun defending these actions as just one group trying to put its language on others. Then again, its seems like a cheap move to always bring up Hitler. 

- To say that there was no right and wrong in WWII is so very difficult.  Now the Relatavist doesn't have to accept that the Nazis were just as good as anybody else, they can still make their own moral judgments, but they are purely cultural, not housed in Reason or Expressivist rules. 

-But the Expressivist can easily ethically judge the right of the Allies against the wrong of the Axis.  They can synthesize through the actions of each group and the ethics they represented that one group was ethically correct and one was not.  To reiterate, as we saw in the last post, the moral principle of the allies was a rule, it was a law, not a law given but a law synthesized through rational deliberation.

-Rorty's main attack, through the concept of contingency, was on Truth with a big T.  He thought that relativism killed any meaning for a priori truth.  As we have seen, the Expressivist avoids this dilemma.  It fully takes contingency into account and manages to form a usable ethic from it. 


 

September 22, 2005 in Blackburn | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Expressivist Normative Ethics

This is the third entry on Simon Blackburn's "Ruling Passions".  The first is Simon Blackburn: Ruling Passions, the second Expressivist Meta-Ethics.

- It may seem from the nature of Expressivist Meta-Ethics that they would support relativism for normative ethics.  I thought this, considering the focus on "attitudes" and the uniqueness of each situation through the "holism of the mental".  But I was wrong and you would be wrong as well.  In fact, Blackburn hates relativists (as we will see in the next entry) and styles a strong position for a normative ethic. 

The Ladder of Emotions

- This is a very interesting metaphor that Blackburn employs to explain how these attitudes are weighed by humans.  He compares the gravity of each emotion to a ladder or staircase.  We all have ethical attitudes towards all things, but some we take more seriously and some we do not care whether people oppose that attitude. 

- We all have attitudes about a lot of different things.  Some of us care for certain things in a way that may seem highly unusual to others.  The person who lives, breathes, and sleeps for the Minnesota Vikings, for instance. 
Vikingsfan
That person would be looked at as absurd (rightly) by just about everyone. 

But what this shows is that he places his attitude about football higher on his emotional ladder than most others.  Blackburn proposes that as you ascend the ladder, you move from more trite preferences to more highly-held ethical beliefs.

"The staircase gives us a scale between pure preference, on the one hand, and attitudes with all the flavour (he's British) of ethical commitment, on the other.  The scale is not only emotional, in the sense that it is measured by strength of feeling...But in this sense strength of feeling is also a matter of degree to which things capture our attention, our degree of engagement, and our readiness to deploy pressures on other people to conform or to change."

Thus, here are some examples of what some people's emotional ladders might look like:

Emotional_ladder_4

Karl_rove_ladder_1
Zen_ladder

-As you can see, the attitudes at the bottom are ones that are just preferences.  If others don't abide by those attitudes, then so be it, we have a difference of opinion.  Like how MC Philo doesn't really care if people don't like Quiznos, that's their own attitude and they're entitled to it, and if they don't respect their parents, then a little more offense is taken, but they're not awful people, and so on.  It is those attitudes at the top that we would normally label as our "ethical principles".  So even though some might say they are "just attitudes", they are attitudes with ascending strength of value placed beside them when we consider them and act upon them. 

- Blackburn says that a "bigot" is someone who ascends the ladder too quickly, thus putting what should be preferences like, "Packers are good" too highly on the list and disrespecting those who don't feel that way. 

How Ladder is created

-Let me reiterate from the last entry on how society makes these upper values in people.  As Hume says, "men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves". 

-These higher eschelon emotions/attitudes/values are determined by what Locke called the "Law of Opinion".  We see what people are sympathetic to in our community, like "not killing for gain".  We then personally deliberate upon it, find we have respect for those who hold it, and then assimilate it into our values.  This is why different cultures have different values even at the highest rings of the ladder.  But as we shall see, that does not mean all cultures are correct and relativism is king. 

Moral Law

-Boy does Blackburn avoid using this term for fear of its implications.  The concept of Moral Law had been high jacked by the Kantians and deemed to be too righteous and limiting.  Many cringe at the words just they cringed during Silence of the Lambs
Lambs

- But without any sort of Moral Law ethics becomes hollow and relativity reigns.  The reason Blackburn avoids this term is because he does not want to imply that these moral rules are inherent or brought about  a priori, "Hume can and does vigorously assert the conditionals that express standards.  All he denies is that they are truths of reason, having an apriori or analytic status, or guaranteed by logic alone."

- It is not the categorical imperative or any other wholly a priori thing which gives us ethical standards, but logical determinations by people within a group who come to find certain things wholly wrong, and don't allow dissent of any kind.  But these "laws" can't avoid the "holism of the mental".

"We cannot think that each situation , in its full particularity, needs treating distinctly from each other situation, for then we have no ethic to communicate and to rely upon.  And we do not want glacially abstract general principles, for then we miss the interesting texture of the particular problems.  Our sensibilities need to be firm, but flexible, for both these are virtues." 

- So things like "killing is wrong" would not be accepted, for it discounts many many possibilities in which killing would be necessary, and morally acceptable.  But situations like "killing for profit" seem wholly wrong and there is no situation in which killing solely for profit would be right. 

So its not like we have this kind of law
Commandments

But more like this kind
Parliament The laws might be right, but they are determined, not given

Civility and War

-Blackburn doesn't want to say it, but his view advocates war at some junctures.  "At the top end of the emotional scale are cases of harm and evil where dissent is not tolerated."  He doesn't want to advocate it, so he says things like "I am against you too, and my opposition may show itself in any number of ways, from avoiding your company...to seeking to change you, to constraining you as I can, or deploying social and legal pressures of all kinds against you."  It really has to be wrung out of him, but there are cases when "it may become a case of conflict."

-His idea is to use as much of what Hume would call "civility".  That is, respecting other cultures when they come into conflict.  Trying to understand their views and mend disagreements so as to avoid conflict.  But there are times when disagreements can't be mended. 
Burka This treatment is not tolerated no matter what for us, so action may be needed.  Preferably through "civility" but then through sanctions, and finally, we should hope to be the first to draw our guns. 

Vikingsfan_1Same here

Next up: Blackburn Ruling Ethics

September 20, 2005 in Blackburn | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Expressivist Meta-ethics

This is the second entry on Simon Blackburn's "Ruling Passions".  The first is Simon Blackburn: Ruling Passions


Definitions:

Meta-ethics - The nature of decision making processes and ethical evaluations.  As opposed to Normative Ethics which tells you what is good/bad or right/wrong. 
Normativity - Properties attributed to ethical evaluations and actions like good and bad
A Priori Principle of Interpretation (API) - That it is analytic that creatures with beliefs, desires, and other states of mind, behave in ways that (best) make sense (and not in ways that make no sense), given those states of mind
Concerns - Things that matter to us
Maxim - A subjective principle for action
Agent - A deliberating human

The Essence of Expressivism is that all agents form value systems towards the world.   These value systems are based on attitudes that they gather from experiences.  Expressivism holds that moral sentiments are too complicated to be widdled into general maxims like the categorical imperative.  Each agent is a unique individual whose experiences shape their attitudes into a complex value system.  It views normative statements as expressive properties of the individual.  These attitudes are not deliberated upon by some objective Reason, as the Kantian proposes, but weighed by the self based on their own values.

So this decision
Murderis not a case of Reason gone wrong, but an agent whose deliberation upon their attitudes has caused them to weigh murder higher than, lets say, compromise.  Likewise, his decision to wear all black was a deliberative decision that it is hip nowadays so he wouldn't be noticed on the streets, and in this case, he values his anonymity over his lucky orange sweater.   

- Therefore, moral propositions are not found in the nature of the world but rather in the self.  "Reason can inform us of the facts of the case, features of the situations in which we have to act", but it is our individual ruling passions that ultimately cause us to act. 

- As Blackburn writes, "expressivists think we can say interestingly what is involved for a subject S to think that X is good.  It is for S to value it, and this can be explained in natural terms.  Nature itself may be heartless and free of desires, but amongst the creatures it has thrown up are some which are not heartless, and not free of desires."

Smoking (Weighed desire)

Inputs and Outputs

- Blackburn represents the agent as something that takes in inputs from the outside world, deliberates and forms an attitude towards which manifest in certain outputs.  "The input to the system is a representation, for instance of an action, or a situation...as having certain properties.  The output...is a certain attitude, or a pressure on attitudes, or a favoring of policies choices and actions."

- Expressivism is based on the output state, for we all receive the representations from the world around us, but expressivism holds that the output is based not upon Reason or Nature but upon the self making judgments. 

- A helpful tool is to think of inputs coming in to the individual and that individual makes automatic weighted judgments of them off the bat, like "red apple (yah!)" or "green apple (nah!)".  You have a like for red apples, but not for green ones, based on your accrued values (of differing levels which we will get to).  You judge inputs based on such criteria. 

Gbp Yeah!

VikingsNah!
(it is arguable that this is objective truth)

- It has to be noted that this should be considered different than (good!) and (bad!).  This judgment can reach that normative point, but the expressivist has more primordial attitudes before these necessarily come into context. 

Holism of the Mental

- This idea is a very famous one that represents the complexity with which mental activities happen.  Every attitude we form is made with respect to many different connections to other attitudes in our environment.

Mcarthur_2   This picture could just be viewed as two men standing next to each other and not elicit much strong reaction either way.  But because of the idea of Holism of the Mental, it is not a picture on its own but it has ample context.  Namely, that it is General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito after the Japanese surrendered.  This picture was specifically taken to show the short status of this "God" emperor next to the strong American.  At the time, and to those who recognize it today, it would elicit a resounding (yeah!).

Concerns

- We have many concerns in the world, things that affect us in varying degrees.  An agent knows which type of concern affects them strongest by which they choose to act upon.  When given the choice between an immediate pleasure and something say, that my wife wants me to do, it might seem like the immediate pleasure would always win.  But our concerns are complex, and certain things, like not hearing it from the old lady, might sway you to do what "has to be done".

Cause don't we all know about this:

Wifey_1

-Blackburn addresses it thusly, "If some third person is to understand why I am doing the dishes when I want to watch the game, then they must find the aspect of doing the dishes that concerns me: my concern to fill my role as a dutiful husband".  You have weighed your concerns and made a decision expressing which is stronger.

- This is necessarily supported by API (defined above).  Agents will do what makes sense to them given their situation for "If we try to suggest cases where creatures (systematically) do what makes no sense to them, we end up denying the application of beliefs and desires at all."  Luckily, API heads off all the annoying ethics class kids who want to say, "but what about the crazy person", as if they just made the best point of the class.

Nuts The crazy person does what makes sense to them, they weigh their options like the rest of us, and if you're like this guy (pictured), ax murder weighs stronger than a ubiquitous gun murder. 

Captain

- Now that we have an understanding of how inputs and outputs complexly affect our ethical position in the world, it is imperative to understand exactly how the Expressivist thinks we actually weigh and make decisions.

- To help illustrate this, the metaphor of the Captain is very helpful.  Think of the mind and its deliberating process as a ship with a crew and a captain.  In the Kantian ethic, it is the captain that holds all the power.  The captain is objective Reason and they command the crew with an iron fist.  But for Hume, Blackburn and the expressivists, "the ship is worked by a crew, each representing a passion or inclination or sentiment, and where the ship goes is determined by the resolution of conflicting pressures among the crew."  So the expressivist believes that the crew each has its own agency and reason behind it that is weighed by the individual, like a parliament. 

Reason_diagram_1

Here, the strongest (biggest) reason would win out for the expressivist, whereas it didn't matter what was the biggest for the Kantian, objective Reason would determine what to do.
(This diagram idea thanks to Paul Hurley at Pomona College)

How We Get Values

- This is done socially, based on what we experience in the world around us.

1. We admire a quality in others
2. We sympathize with that quality and try to emulate it

I see Daddy go into the Middle East

Bush1

I admire his want for war and oil, but want to kill that bitch ass Saddam so, I go into the Middle East

Iraq_war

Bush II weighed each little circle in his head, looking something like this:

Bushs_though

Sensible Knave

- Responding to a long-standing tradition of thinking of knave-like characters as irrational human beings, like the Kantian, would presume, Hume demonstrated the sensible knave.  He understands the communities values, just doesn't personally value them as high as others.  (See above).

Egoism

-Blackburn believes that because there are other objects that we regard when we do things, and because not all of our action brings pleasure, then some actions are others-regarding, not self-regarding, like the Egoist would say.  (Actually, not all Egoists believe that all actions must be self-regarding, but that topic shan't be addressed here.)


Next up: Expressivist Normative Ethics

September 16, 2005 in Blackburn | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Simon Blackburn: Ruling Passions



Blackburn
Simon Blackburn   (1944-  )
- Current Professor at Cambridge University
- Proponent of the Humean Tradition
- Creator of Quasi-Realism
- Work to be discussed: Ruling Passions

Positions Defended: Expressivism, Quasi-Realism, Humean thought, Popularization of philosophy
Those Who are Definitely Wrong: Kantians, Mills, Relativists, Other cultures that don't share our highest moral regards

- Reading Blackburn is almost like reading a secondary source, for his argument is to affirm one philosopher and tear down all the opponents.  Though some of his concepts are original, this work is best to be thought of as a summary of ethical positions and defense of Humean Expressivism.  The reason we are discussing him is because he does this very eloquently and being modern, he has the advantage of being able to address many modern theories.

- Blackburn's writing style is very readable, he uses analogy well and understands and expresses the intricacy of situations, which is imperative when having an ethical discussion.

-He also should be commended for using the "she" form for all third person singular statements about ethical situations or arguments.  Believe me, in ethics writing there is a great necessity to use this device and he went with "she" over the traditional philosopher's exclusive use of "he". 

Dworkin (Dworkin may look angry here, but it's actually a lewd gesture thanking Blackburn for subtlety affirming the equality of women in philosophy)

- Blackburn's book is systematic and addresses and attacks many different ethical positions.  From minor and trite language debates to broad concepts that have plagued ethical thought, he takes them all on.  I won't go into all these refutations, but focus on his affirmation of Expressionism and his bludgeoning of 3 other major ethical beliefs. Before we indulge into the meat of the subjects, it is necessary to establish the doctrines of the 4 major ethical traditions that are discussed in Ruling Passions: Consequentialism (Mill), Deontologicalism (Kant), Relativism (in this case, Rorty), and Expressivism (Hume).  As you will see, by the end, all who oppose Expressionism will be hating themselves in the same way Spinoza does. 

Consequentialism

- This doctrine was made famous by John Stuart Mill.  It proposes that normative ethical propositions should be decided in terms of their consequences.  The actual dilemma in front of the agent shouldn't be qualified by an immediate right/wrong device, but rather should be considered in light of its consequences for all people. 

- Mill believed that these ethical decisions should be chosen with utility in mind.  For him, and most consequentialists, the utility of your action should be directed towards the "greatest good for the greatest number".  That is, when you make a decision, it should be made by thinking about how your decision will positively influence human-kind. 

Utilitarianism_1 Yes, presumably even people in wheelchairs and Minute Bol should be considered

- The utility that positively influenced human-kind was supposed to be the "greatest happiness principle".  This isn't just happiness in a superficial way, but the cultural and spiritual happiness of all. 

- Utilitarianism had practical applications as well.  As Blackburn describes it, "utilitarianism proposed a measure for weighing social institutions, and in particular law.  Laws would be justified in so far as they contributed to the public good"

- This is the type of system that Spinoza wanted to uphold, for those of you who are familiar with the previous postings

Deontologicalism

- Kantian thought is governed by duty.  Each person determines what their duty is in each situation based on unmovable principles and follows them completely. 

Bush_2 Like how his duty is to fuck us as much as possible

- Unlike the aforementioned example, these principles are determined by Reason.  These reasonable principles bind the ethical agent into acting accordingly, no matter what.

-The device Kant gave to determine the Reasonable ethical action is called the Categorical Imperative.  Boy, is this idea famous.  It is basically a very well argued example of the Golden Rule.  You are demanded to act in ways that you think every agent should act.

-Thus, the act of stealing is a bad action, for we would not want the maxim "stealing is acceptable" to be the case for all agents.  For instance, pointing and telling a younger brother "look!" so they have to look, and then you steal their last chicken wing, that's bad, and we wouldn't want that action to be repeated by all older brothers. 

-As Blackburn rightly points out, The Ten Commandments are a long-standing example of things that people think should be held as across the board maxims.  Though Christians (luckily for them) don't follow the categorical imperative,

Inquisition(that's the Spanish Inquisition)

Relativism

- Let's be brief about this.  Basically, this theory is that your community decides it is ethical to partake in action A, lets call it cutting off young male's balls so they can keep their voices nice and high, and my community thinks that action A is wrong.  Well, as the Dude would say, "That's just like your opinion, man".  Go ahead, cut off their balls, that's how you all do things and we do them differently. 

Dude_1 Here is the Dude before the German nihilists threaten to cut off his balls

- Relativism is actually more complicated then the aforementioned bad taste joke, and some Relativistic theories are very well thought out.   Richard Rorty, who we will discuss fully later, has an interesting theory on relativity: that all communal ethics are based in different vocabularies and that each society wants to impose their vocabulary (their ethic) on others so as to change the frame of the debate and push their ethic on the others.   This is easily understood by terms like "partial-birth abortion", "death tax" and "freedom". 

- Now that we have cataloged all the other ethical positions we can more clearly see how Blackburn will attack them.  This I will save for the next post. 

Next Up: Expressivist Meta-Ethics

 

September 14, 2005 in Blackburn | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack (0)

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